The attraction of bioweapons in war, and for use in
terroristic attacks is attributed to easy access to a wide range of
disease-producing biological agents, to their low production costs,
to their non-detection by routine security systems , and to their easy
transportation from one place to another. In counteraction of such threats,
and in securing the culture and defence of peace, the need for leadership
and example in devising preventive and protective strategies has been
emphasised through international consultation and co-operation. Adherence
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, sustained by use of
monitoring and verification protocols, is i an important and necessary
step in eliminating the threats of biowarfare and bioterrorism.
Introduction
The attraction for bioweapons in war, and for use in
terroristic attacks is attributed to their low production costs, The
easy access to a wide range of disease-producing biological agents,
their non-detection by routine security systems, and their easy transportation
from one location to another are other attractive features (Atlas,
1998). Their properties of invisibility and virtual weightlessness
render detection and verification procedures ineffectual and make non-proliferation
of such weapons an impossibility. Current concerns regarding the use
of bioweapons result from their production for use in the 1991 Gulf
War; and from the increasing number of countries that are engaged in
the proliferation of such weapons i.e. from about four in the mid-1970s
to about 17 today (Cole, 1997).
Biological/Chemical Warfare Characteristics
Biological and chemical warfare share several common
features. A rather comprehensive study of the characteristics of chemical
and biological weapons, the types of agents, their acquisition and delivery
has been made (Purver, 1995). Formulae and recipes
for fabricating such types of weapons, which to date, have been used
in bio- and chemoterroristic attacks against small groups of individuals,
result from increasing acdaemic proficiency in biology, chemistry, engineering
and genetic manipulations. A general state of helplessness resulting
from a total lack of preparedness and absence of decontaminating strategies
further complicates the issue. As a rule, microbiologists have pioneered
research in the development of a bioarmoury comprised of powerful antibiotics,
antisera, toxoids and vaccines to neutralise and eliminate a wide range
of diseases. However, despite the use of biological agents in military
campaigns, it is only since the mid-1980s that the attention of the
military intelligence has been attracted by the spectacular breakthroughs
in the life sciences (Wright, 1985). Military interest,
in harnessing genetic engineering and DNA recombinant technology for
updating and devisi lethal bioweapons is spurred on by the easy availability
of funding, even in times of economic regression, for contractual research
leading to the development of (i) vaccines against a variety of bacteria
and viruses identified in core control and warning lists of biological
agents used in biowarfare, (ii) rapid detection, identification and
neutralization of biological and chemical warfare agents, (iii) development
of genetically-modified organisms, (iv) development of bioweapons with
either incapacitating or lethal characteristics, (v) development of
antianimal agents e.g. rabbit calcivirus disease (RCD) to curb overpopulation
growth of rabbits in Australia and New Zealand, and (vi) development
of antiplant contagious agents of rust, smut, etc.
Bioweapons
Genetic engineering, and information are inceasingly
open to misuse in the development and improvement of infective agents
as bioweapons. Such misuse could be envisaged in the development of
antibiotic-resistant microorganisms, and in the enhanced invasiveness
and pathogenicity of commensals. Resistance to potent antibiotics constitutes
a weak point in the bio-based arsenal designed to protect urban and
rural populations against lethal bioweapons. An attack with bioweapons
using antibiotic-resistant strains could initiate the occurrence and
spread of communicable diseases, such as anthrax and plague, on an endemic
or epidemic scale. The institution of food insecurity is a subtle form
of economic and surrogate biological warfare. Human health, food security
and the management of the environment are continuously being threatened,
regionally and globally, by dwindling reserves of water (Serageldin,1999).
Deliberate contamination of food with herbicide, pesticide or heavy
metal residues, and use of land for crops for production of luxurious
ornamental plants and cut flowers, are other aspects of food insecurity.
The deliberate release of pathogenic organisms, that kill cash crops
and destroy the reserves of an enemy, constitutes an awesome weapon
of biological warfare and bioterrorism (Rogers et al, 1999).Anticrop
warfare, involving biological agents and herbicides, results in debilitating
famine, malnutrition, decimation of agriculture-based economies, and
food insecurity.. Defoliants in the Vietnam war have been widely used
as agents of anticrop warfare. Cash crops that have been targeted in
anticrop warfare are sweet potatoes, soybeans, sugar beets, cotton,
wheat, and rice (Whitby and Rogers, 1997).
Bioterrorism
Public awareness of the growing threat of bioterrorism
in the USA is gathering momentum. Development of national preparedness
and an emergency response, focus in essence, on the co-ordination of
on-site treatment of the incapacitated and wounded, on-spot decontamination
of the affected environment, detection of the type and character of
the biological agent, and its immediate isolation and neutralization.
The rise of bioterrorism as a priority item on the agendas of international
concern and co-operation is now being reflected in the establishment
of verification procedures to guard against contravention of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, and in efforts in institutionalizing a
desirable and much needed state of preparedness. International workshops
and seminars focus on the peaceful use of biotechnology and the Convention
on Biological Weapons. In addition several other measures are in force
to monitor the development and use of bioweapons (Pearson,
1998).
A recent survey of over 1400 research institutions,
universities, medical colleges, and health science centres in the USA
focused on research activities, production capabilities and containment
facilities that may necessitate compliance declarations with the protocols
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Compliance declarations
and regimes are of direct consequence with institutions that are engaged
in routine and genetically-engineered research with specialized groups
of microbial pathogens and toxins; and that do contract research for
government and industry with biological agents that could serve as potential
triggers of biological warfare and bioterrorism (Weller
et al, 1999). The role of industry in designing apt verification
measures is a crucial element in the strengthening of the Convention,
The practise of such investigations emphasizes the growing need for
the development of a verification protocol that deters and discourages
violation of the Convention.
Control, Monitoring and Reporting Systems
The development of a response strategy and technology
in monitoring the control of weapons is at the core of a state of preparedness
in the USA (New York Academy of Sciences, 1998). Current
anti-bioterrorism measures involve the devising of unconventional effective
countermeasures to combat misuse of pathogens encountered either naturally
or in a genetically-modified state. Guidelines and recommendations have
been formulated for use by public health administrators and policy-makers,
medical and para-clinical practitioners, and technology designers and
engineers in developing civilian preparedness for terrorist attack (Institute
of Medicine, 1999). Areas covered deal with rapid detection of biological
and chemical agents, pre-incident analysis of the targeted area, protective
clothing, and use of vaccines and pharmaceuticals in treatment and decontamination
of mass casualties.
Biodetection systems functioning as early warning/alert
systems involve the detection of biological particle densities by laser
eyes and electronic noses with incorporated alarms. Emphasis is less
on the identity of the biological agent, and more on the early warning
aspect which constitutes an effective arm in counteracting the threat
of bioterrorism in daily and routine peace time environments (Schutz
et al, 1999).
Conclusion
Biological warfare can be used with impunity under
the camouflage of natural outbreaks of disease to decimate human populations,
and to destroy livestock and crops of economic significance. New threats
from weapons of mass destruction continue to emerge as a result of the
availability of technology and capacity to produce, world-wide, such
weapons for use in terrorism and organized crime (Department
of Defense, 1996). Novel and accessible technologies give rise to
proliferation of such weapons that have implications for regional and
global security and stability. In counteraction of such threats, and
in securing the defence of peace, the need for leadership and example
in devising preventive and protective responses has been emphasized
through the need for training of civilian and non-civilian personnel,
and their engagement in international co-operation. These responses
emphasize the need for the reduction and elimination of bioterrorism
threats through consultation, monitoring and verification procedures;
and deterrence, through the constant availability and maintenance of
a conventional law and order force that is well-versed in counterproliferation
controls and preparedness protocols (American Society for
Microbiology, 1999). Adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, reinforced by confidence-building measure is indeed,
an important and necessary step in reducing and eliminating the threats
of biological warfare and bioterrorism (Tucker,1999)
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